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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between household savings
and family size. Household savings are important indicators of fam-
ily welfare, not only in terms of a household's investment and in-
come generation prospects, but also, and perhaps more importantly—
given pervasive borrowing constraints and limited social security
coverage—in terms of its ability to secure protection from income
shortfalls. This paper also provides descriptive and multivariate evi-
dence on the relationship of household savings and family size. It
also rightly considers the endogeneity of family size in the house-
hold savings equation, as argued in the old-age security hypoth-
esis, by using the instrumental variables estimation technique.
The paper likewise uses a recent nationally representative house-
hold survey in the analysis. The results show that, on average, the
impact of additional children on household savings is both negative
and regressive.
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INTRODUCTION
The importance of savings in development is well known. The traditional interest
on savings is that, at the aggregate and household levels, it is the main determi-
nant of investment. Investment, of course, is acknowledged as the primary engine
of economic growth. This can be easily demonstrated, albeit crudely, by running a
simple regression between gross domestic savings and investment.1 At the house-
hold level, while investments and income prospects may also be important as
determinants of savings, protection against income shortfalls may be more rel-
evant, particularly if there are borrowing constraints and/or social security is not
well developed. Savings are the vehicle for consumption smoothing, as argued in
the celebrated life-cycle hypothesis. Saving, on a regular basis, has been recently
found to enable households to move out of slum areas (Lall et al. 2005). Both of
these macroeconomic and microeconomic concerns are evident in the Philippines.
The savings rates in the country are low, even lower than those of Indonesia,
which has lower per capita income (Orbeta 2005a). These low savings rates have
been identified as one of the main reasons why the country has not grown as fast
as her neighbors. Low household savings also expose households to the risk of
income shortfalls.
Given the foregoing, policymakers would do well to determine the reasons
for the low savings rate in the country. As far as the author is aware, Bautista and
Lamberte (1990) is the latest available household savings study, based on data
from a survey conducted 30 years ago. Updating this study using new data is vital
to understanding the savings behavior of Philippine households. In addition,
determining the role of children in household savings provides an added dimen-
sion to the low savings rate of the country.
This study is part of a series of studies2 conducted by the author on the
implications of large family size on household welfare. The general motivation for
these studies is to understand the relation between poverty, vulnerability, and
family size. Saving is an important instrument for consumption smoothing and
reducing vulnerability to income shortfall. Understanding the impact of children
and family size on household savings behavior is an important step in understand-
ing the relationship between poverty, vulnerability, and family size.
The study estimates savings functions using data from the 2002 Annual
Poverty Indicator Survey (APIS), augmented by barangay-level data from the 2000
Census of Population and Housing. The estimation challenge is that, given the
old-age security motivation of bearing children, plus the quantity-quality hypoth-
esis of having children, the number of children is endogenous to the savings
1 Mason (1988), for instance, found the coefficient of the savings to GDP ratio to be 0.63.
2 The other studies deal with the impact of family size on labor force participation and income (Orbeta
2005b) on the education of children (Orbeta 2005c).ORBETA 3
equation, which could lead to biased results if ignored. The paper dealt with this
problem using instrumental variables estimation, as proposed in Angrist and Evans
(1998). The study finds that the impact of children on household savings is, on
average, negative. In addition, this impact is regressive, with bigger depressing
effect among poorer households.
The study is organized as follows: The next section presents a brief review
of related literature. This is followed by a discussion of methodology and estima-
tion concerns. A description of the data set and the variables used also comprises
this section. The estimation results are presented in the fourth section. The final
section provides a summary and policy implications.
Review of previous studies
The literature on savings is extensive yet fraught with controversies. It is not the
purpose of the paper to disentangle these controversies. Rather, it focuses on the
role of children in household savings, with the end in view of understanding how
to estimate the independent impact of children on household savings after other
factors have been considered. After some discussion on the general motivations
for household savings, this study focuses on the role of family size and children
on household savings. Those interested on aggregate savings are referred to
Schultz (2004), among others, and the references therein.
Browning and Lusardi (1996) provide a comprehensive review of the recent
household savings literature3. They noted that to the eight motives for savings
identified in Keynes (1936), only one was added (the down payment motive) until
the time of the review. The eight include: (1) pre-cautionary; (2) life-cycle; (3)
intertemporal substitution; (4) improvement; (5) independence; (6) enterprise; (7)
bequest; and (8) avarice/miserliness.
The survey contains several observations that are important for empirically
estimating savings functions and which bear repeating here. One, there is consid-
erable heterogeneity in the motives for savings, implying that a single explanation
will not suffice for all members at any given time or even for the same person over
time. Two, while a sophisticated intertemporal theory of consumption has led to a
large empirical literature, empirical work on savings (treated as the difference be-
tween income and current consumption) is “relatively atheoretical.”  Finally, using
intertemporal consumption theory, five major determinants of savings have been
identified, namely: (1) the discount factor; (2) demographics4; (3) real interest rate;
(4) variation in consumption; and (5) liquidity constraint. Deaton (1990) and
3 See Mikesell and Zinser (1973) for an earlier comprehensive review of the savings literature at the
macro level.
4 This factor has been largely ignored in aggregate time series literature (largely because it does not
change much at the aggregate level) but is potentially extremely important at the micro level.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 4
Gersovitz (1988) have identified several reasons why savings behavior in develop-
ing countries may diverge from the textbook case developed in Browning and
Lusardi (1996): (1) households are dynastic and as such survive individual mem-
bers; (2) household is an indecomposable unit and savings are decided at the
household rather than at the individual level; (3) households have lower and more
uncertain income; (4) borrowing constraints may be much more pervasive; and (5)
savings provide buffer for uncertain and unpredictable income rather than
intertemporal consumption smoothing.
The Browning and Lusardi (1996) survey has also emphasized that while a
description of who the savers are is not difficult to establish in many societies, it is
not as easy to empirically determine the motivations for savings. The celebrated
life-cycle hypothesis, for instance, has been put to question by evidence showing
continued savings even at old age (e.g., Mikesell and Zinser 1973; Weil 1994). It is
easy to establish that savings rates are higher among higher-income or more
educated households. It is likewise easy to observe that savings rate increases
with age until the period around retirement, after which it decreases. But when it
comes to establishing the motivations for savings, hypotheses tests fail to pro-
vide definitive results.
The empirical definitions of savings come in two forms: (1) the difference
between income (Y) and current consumption (C); and (2) the change in wealth
(A), i.e., At+1-At=rAt+Yt-Ct, r is the interest rate. It is well known that what
constitutes savings varies across societies. Using financial savings alone can
underestimate wealth accumulation in societies where financial development
is low. It has been argued that human capital investments (particularly educa-
tion) should be considered savings (e.g., Gesovitz 1988). Expenditure on du-
rable goods, livestock, or housing materials had been considered a form of
savings as well. Lamberte and Bautista (1988), for instance, net out expendi-
ture on education and on durable goods from consumption spending in defin-
ing savings in the Philippines. The form of the dependent variable used in
savings functions also varies. Savings functions have been estimated in lev-
els (e.g., total savings or savings per capita) as well as in rates (e.g., ratio of
savings to income, usually disposable income).
As for the role of children and family size on household savings, several
explanations have been offered. For one, consumption theory tells us that
consumption is directly proportional to the number of household members.
There is little challenge to this proposition except that perhaps those children
need not be treated equally like adults. Hence, the popularity of the concept of
adult equivalent units.
Another hypothesis states that children can substitute for savings because
they are a form of old-age security (Neher 1972; Willis 1980; Nerlove et al. 1985).ORBETA 5
Cain (1981) has argued that children can be a source of risk insurance in high-risk
settings. Furthermore, given problems of moral hazards, adverse selection and
deception inherent in public annuities or just their limited coverage or total ab-
sence, the family may prove to be a better institution for risk sharing (Kotlikoff and
Spivak 1981). Hammer (1986) has provided evidence that financial development
can appear to be a substitute for having children. The substitutability of pension
wealth and savings has been established using developed country data (e.g.,
Diamond and Hausman 1984 and Hubbard 1986 for the US; Attanasio and
Brugiavini 2003 for Italy). Early direct evidence on the existence of old-age secu-
rity incentive for having children was also found using Philippines and Taiwan
data, and it was found to be larger in the former (De Vos 1985). Children also
affect savings through other variables (Hammer 1986; Kelley 1988): (1) children
can be substitutes for other consumption goods; (2) they can contribute directly
to market and nonmarket household income; (3) they can encourage (discour-
age) parents to work5; (4) they encourage the accumulation (reduction) of es-
tates; and (5) they encourage the accumulation (reduction) of certain assets
(e.g., human capital, farm implements).
Literature from developed countries consistently shows a negative relation-
ship between family size and household savings. Browning and Lusardi (1996), for
instance, have reported that savings ratio is higher among childless couples,
lower among households with children, and lowest among lone parents. Harris et
al. (1999), using Australian data, found a negative and significant relationship
between household savings (measured as ordered discrete responses) and both
the number of children and whether or not there are children in the household.
Early literature, using the 1950 US Survey of Consumption Expenditures, showed
that controlling for household income, age, and occupation of the household
head, savings fall significantly as family size increases from one to three members,
but decline gradually thereafter (Eizenga 1961). Smith and Ward (1980), using US
data, have found that young children depress savings for young families but
increase them in marriages with duration of more than five years. They pointed out
that the main channel through which children depress savings is the child-in-
duced withdrawal of mothers from the labor force. Even if family consumption is
found to decrease with the birth of a child, this reduction is not sufficient to offset
the fall in income. Smith and Ward (1980) have also found that the impact of
children on family consumption, and by implication, on savings, depends on their
impact on family income and family consumption. The dominant link of children to
the income side is the child-induced lower work effort of women.
5 Orbeta (2005b) has shown that having additional children reduces labor force participation and
income of mothers but does not significantly affect the labor force participation of fathers.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 6
A much less understood link is whether the father and/or older children’s
time offsets this reduction in the work effort of the mother.6 On the consumption
side, children have two effects. One, goods devoted for children will obviously
increase proportionately. Two, the impact on other goods will depend on whether
they substitute for or complement children. These considerations indicate that the
effect of children will depend on the age of their parents, the previous consump-
tion history, and the children’s ages.
As with many other issues, the empirical evidence of the impact of children
on household savings is relatively scarce in developing countries (Schultz 2004).
A review of earlier research using developing country data done in Mason (1988)
showed mixed results. In Korea, rural household savings are not depressed by
dependency ratio while urban household average savings and marginal propen-
sity to save are inversely related to household size (Kim 1974). Kelly and
Williamson (1968), using data from Indonesia, found that savings vary with the
number of equivalent adults in rural households but not in urban households.
Musgrove (1978), using data from five South American countries, notes that the
results vary from country to country. In Columbia, Chile, and Equador, consump-
tion increases with the number of children. An additional child is estimated to
reduce savings, on average, by 1.0 to 1.5 percent. In Peru and Venezuela, con-
sumption declines with the number of children. Kelinbaum and Mason (1987)
have found that in Thailand, additional children (three to 12 years old) depress
the savings ratio from one to two percentage points, depending on the socio-
economic status of the household and the educational attainment of its head.
The impact of additional children on Korean households was found greater.
More recent results from Thailand have confirmed this earlier result. Havanon et
al. (1992), using multiclassification analysis, noted a negative relationship be-
tween wealth accumulation (measured in terms of consumer goods and financial
savings and housing) and family size in rural Thailand. The results seem to
indicate that the impact is much larger in more developed areas, e.g., larger in
Korea compared to Thailand, significant in urban but not in rural Korea (with
contrasting results from Indonesia).
Evidence using data from the Philippines is much more consistent in show-
ing the negative impact of children on household savings and asset accumula-
tion. Peek (1974), using data for 1965 and 1971, found that given household
income, an increase in household size reduces savings, but the number of chil-
dren under age 18 has no significant effect on savings. In his analysis of house-
6 Angrist and Evans (1998) provide recent evidence supporting findings on the negative impact of
children on the labor force participation of mothers and the insignificant impact of children on the labor
force participation of fathers.ORBETA 7
hold data from Misamis Oriental, Herrin (1993) showed that the number of young
children aged 0 to 6 and 7 to 12 appears to reduce asset accumulation, suggest-
ing that these age groups are net resource users compared to older children who
can contribute to household income more than they consume. In spite of children’s
contribution to household income, higher fertility households have not shown
an increase in accumulated assets. Using the 1985 FIES, Mason (1992) showed
that (1) the rate of savings is depressed by child bearing; (2) bearing additional
children does not necessarily lead to a reduction in the absolute amount of
savings or in the absolute amount of savings or in the accumulation of wealth;
and (3) asset per child is greater in lower fertility households than in higher
fertility households.
METHODOLOGY, INSTRUMENT, AND DATA
Methodology
To determine the impact of children on household savings, this study esti-
mated savings equations that recognize the endogeneity of the number of
children. The importance of recognizing the endogeneity of children in the
household savings equation is based on the notion that children are a form of
old-age security for parents (Neher 1971; Cain 1981; Hammer 1986; Nerlove et
al. 1987) and therefore an alternative to savings. Gersovitz (1988) argued that
under these conditions it would be inappropriate econometrically to explain
savings using demographic variables unless the endogeneity of the children
variable is considered.
To allow for the endogeneity of the number of children, this study instru-
mented it in the estimation. Following Agrist and Evans (1998), it assumes a
balanced sex-mix and used same sex as the instrument for the number of children.
The validity of this instrument is explained in the following section.
The paper estimates the following savings function:
The variable s represents savings, n is the number of children, y is
income, and X is the vector of household and community characteristics. The
second equation expresses n as a function of the instrument z and the house-
hold and community characteristics X. Given this structure, ε and μ are pre-
sumably correlated.
As Paxon (1992) pointed out, a savings equation that is linear in income can
be obtained by maximizing a lifetime utility function that is additively separable
over time and has either a quadratic or a constant-absolute-risk aversion form.
This is also amply demonstrated in Browning and Lusardi (1996).PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 8
7 Other savings definitions such as the change in stock household assets cannot be applied because
no data on assets are available in the data set.
Two savings definitions7 are used in this paper. One is the difference be-
tween total income and total expenditures (definition 1). The other recognizes that
some of the household expenditures do not provide immediate benefits, or the
benefits accrue over some period of time, failing to satisfy the more narrow defini-
tion of consumption. These include expenditures on durable goods, education,
and health. These three components in the household expenditure were added
back in the second savings definition (definition 2). In addition, two savings
concepts were studied, namely: (1) the average savings rates or the ratio of sav-
ings to disposable income, and (2) the savings levels. These are the most common
concepts used in the literature.
The estimation strategy is as follows. This paper first establishes the
endogeneity of the number of children equation using the sex of the first two
children as instruments following Angrist and Evans (1998). This is done by vari-
ous tests available in the ivreg2 Stata routine described in Baum et al. (2003). This
study also checks the relevance of the instruments by determining the first-stage
regression results, particularly the partial R2 for the instruments, and finding out if
there is a weak instrument problem (Bound et al. 1995). The presence of
heteroscedasticity in the data is also tested because this is common in cross-
section data. When endogeneity is established, it is well known that the OLS
estimate will be biased and inconsistent, and 2SLS or GMM estimates would
provide a consistent estimate and, in the case of the GMM, an efficient estimate as
well. When weak instrument is indicated, we present LIML estimates that are
considered more robust than the GMM in this case (Stock et al. 2002). Finally, in
the case of using separate both-male and both-female instruments, the
overidentifying restrictions test results are tested. This, of course, cannot be done
when using the same sex as instrument, as the system is exactly identified. When
endogeneity is not established and heteroscedasticity is present,
heteroscedasticity-corrected OLS estimates is used.
To provide estimates of the expected varying impacts on savings of the
number of children by socioeconomic class, this study estimates the models that
include the interaction of the number of children and the per capita income quintile
dummy variables, using the method deemed most appropriate given the results of
the tests mentioned earlier. The differential impact across socioeconomic class will
be estimated by the sum of the coefficient of the base category and the coefficient
of the corresponding interaction term.ORBETA 9
Balanced sex mix as an instrument
There is a dearth of instruments for the number-of-children-in-household models.
Most of the likely candidates such as household income, education of the parents,
and length of marriage are also related to the dependent variable of interest such
as labor force participation of parents, savings, or education of children, rendering
them inappropriate as instruments. Recent research using US data, such as Angrist
and Evans (1998), used the hypothesis that families prefer to have a balanced sex
mix of children as an instrument for the number of children. The Philippines is one
of the countries in Asia where a balanced sex mix is found to have prevailed in
contrast to countries in South and Eastern Asia, where indications for son prefer-
ence are often found (Wongboonsin and Ruffolo 1995).
Early literature that confirms preference for a balanced sex mix in the Philip-
pines is found in Stinner and Mader (1975). Other available instruments are limited
by their applicability only in very specific circumstances. Having twins in the
family has also been used as instruments, again using US data, initially in
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) and subsequently in studies such as Angrist and
Evans (1998). A much more recent application of the technique was done for the
US (Vere 2005), Romania (Glick, Marini and Sahn 2005), and Norway (Black et al.
2004). Son preference in Korea was likewise used as an instrument for fertility,
such as in Lee (2004). Finally, another instrument would be an exogenous policy
change that could affect child bearing. Quian (2004), for instance, used the relax-
ation of the one-child policy in China that allows rural households to have another
child if the first child is a girl. Viitanen (2003), on the other hand, used the large-
scale giving out of vouchers for privately provided childcare in Finland.
In the case of the balanced sex mix hypothesis, the fact that families do not
have control over the sex of their children makes same sex for the first two children
virtually a random assignment. As Angrist and Evans (1998) argued, using same
sex as an instrument allows a causal interpretation. The downside of this instru-
ment, however, is that it renders families with less than two children unusable for
analysis. While this may be a serious problem in low-fertility areas, it may not be
so in the Philippines, where the average number of children exceeds four.
To check on the validity of this instrument, Table 1 provides a cross tabula-
tion of the average proportion of families that have a third or more children, and
the average number of children categorized by sex of the first- and second-born
children, using the APIS 2002 dataset.  The table shows that 67.4 percent families
with one male and one female for their first two offspring had another child, while
71.8 percent had another child when their first two children were of the same sex,
resulting in a difference of more than 4 percent. The average number of children in
each of these two groups of families is 3.49 and 3.61, respectively, or a difference of
a little over 0.12 children. These average differences are statistically significantPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 10
Table 1. Proportion of families with a third child and average number of children by sex
of the first two children
    Proportion  with
   a third child                Number of children Proportion
Sex of first two children Mean SD SE Mean SD SE to sample
(1) One male, one female 0.6740 0.4688 0.0042 3.4850 1.5436 0.0315 0.964
(2) Both male 0.7179 0.4500 0.0052 3.6452 1.5994 0.0420 0.432
(3) Both female 0.7180 0.4500 0.0063 3.5575 1.4975 0.0495 0.261
(4) Same sex 0.7179 0.4500 0.0040 3.6095 1.5592 0.0320 1.037
Difference (4)-(1) 0.0439 0.0058 0.1245 0.0449
Source of basic data: National Statistics Office, Annual Poverty Indicators Survey, 2002.
under a conventional level of significance. Comparing this with Tables 3 and 5 in
Angrist and Evans (1998), one can observe several differences. The difference in
the proportion of families having a third child among the two groups is smaller and
the standard error is larger. In the case of the difference in the average number of
children, the difference is larger, but so is the standard error. This is not unex-
pected, given the larger family size in the Philippines and the expected larger
dispersion of the distribution. Consequently, the implied t statistics in Table 1 are
not as large as those in Angrist and Evans (1998), indicating that discrimination
generated from the same-sex instrument may not be as strong as those obtained
using US data.
Data sources
The data on individual and household characteristics and location characteristics
were taken from the 2002 Annual Poverty Indicator Survey (APIS). The APIS is a
rider survey to the July round of the quarterly Labor Force Survey conducted by
the National Statistics Office (NSO). The 2002 round is the third of the APIS series
conducted by the NSO. The other two were conducted in 1998 and 1999. The APIS
provides basic demographic information on all members of the household as well
as household amenities. Income and expenditure during the six months preceding
the survey are also gathered. These are the variables used to compute savings.
All monetary values such as income are deflated using provincial consumer
price indices compiled by the Price Division of the NSO. This is done to control for
interprovincial price variability.
Barangay and municipal data from the 2000 Census of Population and Hous-
ing are also used to provide measures of availability of banking facilities and other
indicators of investment opportunities. Hence it is assumed that there is not much
difference in the structure of distribution of the facilities in 2000 and 2002, or thatORBETA 11
whatever changes happened did not upset the relative distribution of the avail-
ability of facilities. These barangay and municipal data were aggregated at the
domain level of the APIS and attached to the APIS data set using domain identifi-
cation variables.
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides savings rates and levels using the two definitions by per capita
income quintile and by number of children. The average savings rate is 2.7 percent
for definition 1 and 9.0 percent for definition 2. In level terms, these percentages
translate to 7,730 and 11,253 (deflated 1994=100) under definition 1 and definition
2, respectively. The emerging pattern across per capita income quintiles shows
dissaving at the bottom two quintiles under definition 1 while the upper three
quintiles have positive savings rates, rising as one moves up the socioeconomic
ladder. Under definition 2 the poorest quintile indicates dissaving, with the rest of
the households having positive savings rates. A similar pattern can, of course, be
seen in the savings levels.
By number of children, the savings rate declines, in general, as one goes
from a two-children household to  a nine-  or more-children family, with an unex-
Table 2. Savings rates and savings level by per capita income quintile and number of
children, 2002
Savings Rates Savings Levels*
Def. 1 Def. 2 Def. 1 Def. 2
Per capita
Income quintile
Poorest -0.208 -0.164 -1,898 -1,373
Lower middle -0.038 0.011 -263 739
Middle 0.048 0.104 2,084 3,883
Upper middle 0.121 0.191 6,930 10,527
Richest 0.218 0.305 31,888 41,816
No. of children
2 0.061 0.120 9,039 12,635
3 0.034 0.099 8,332 12,257
4 0.013 0.078 7,793 11,364
5 -0.005 0.059 6,832 9,963
6 -0.019 0.046 3,471 6,128
7 -0.038 0.020 2,924 5,372
8 -0.004 0.055 5,559 8,435
9 and above -0.007 0.051 3,248 6,348
Philippines 0.027 0.090 7,730 11,253
* Deflated (1994=100)PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 12
pected bulge in six- and seven-children households. This result becomes more
surprising when viewed alongside an unusual drop in savings levels for these
types of households. This can only mean an even greater decline in incomes.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estima-
tion. The average disposable income per capita is 9.6 thousand (deflated 1994=100).
About 84 percent are male-headed households with an average age of 48. The
population per banking unit is 11 thousand. Barangays with access to national
highways comprise about 80 percent, and those with electricity, about the same.
These latter indicators are expected to capture investment opportunities that can
impact savings behavior.
Table 3. Decriptive statistics
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Savings rate, def. 1 29868 0.028 0.288 -1 1
Savings rate, def. 2 29868 0.089 0.286 -1 1
Savings, def 1 29868      7,532       41,775 -399,545 2,645,582
Savings, def 2 29868    10,845       43,857 -138,493 2,648,716
Disp. Inc. per capita, 000 29868 9.6 18.0 0 1557
Male household head 29868 0.84 0.36 0 1
Age of household head 29868 48 13 12 99
Pop per banking inst., 000 29538 11 20 2 167
Prop. of bgy with acc. to nat’l highway 29868 0.80 0.13 0.38 1
Prop. of bgy with electricity 29868 0.80 0.18 0.25 1
Urban dummy 29868 0.59 0.49 0 1
Region 1 dummy 29868 0.05 0.21 0 1
Region 2 dummy 29868 0.04 0.19 0 1
Region 3 dummy 29868 0.10 0.29 0 1
Region 4 dummy 29868 0.16 0.37 0 1
Region 5 dummy 29868 0.05 0.22 0 1
Region 6 dummy 29868 0.07 0.26 0 1
Region 7 dummy 29868 0.06 0.23 0 1
Region 8 dummy 29868 0.05 0.23 0 1
Region 9 dummy 29868 0.04 0.20 0 1
Region 10 dummy 29868 0.05 0.22 0 1
Region 11 dummy 29868 0.05 0.22 0 1
Region 12 dummy 29868 0.04 0.21 0 1
NCR dummy 29868 0.10 0.31 0 1
CAR dummy 29868 0.04 0.20 0 1
ARMM dummy 29868 0.05 0.22 0 1
Caraga dummy 29868 0.04 0.19 0 1
Def 1= Total Income-Total Expenditures.
Def 2= Def 1+Educ Exp.+Health Exp.+Dur. Fur. Exp.ORBETA 13
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Savings rates
Tables 4 and 5 provide the OLS, IV, and heteroscedasticity-corrected OLS esti-
mates for the savings rates under definition 1 and definition 2, respectively. As
shown by the estimates, the endogeneity of the number of children in the
savings equations is not validated by the tests in this particular data set. The
F-values for the Wu-Hausman and the chi-square value for the Durbun-Wu-
Hausman tests are both insignificant. The Pagan-Hall test for heteroscedasticity,
however, is significant, indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity. These
are true for both savings definitions. Thus, the most appropriate estimates are
those from the heteroscedasticity-corrected OLS. This is used in the subse-
quent discussions.
In Table 4, each additional child reduces the savings rates by -0.36 for defi-
nition 1. Table 5 shows that under definition 2, the impact of additional children is
not significant. While the estimates may look small in absolute value, they are not
relative to the recorded average saving rates. Given the average savings rate in the
sample of 0.028, this represents a reduction of about 13 percent.
The other noteworthy results from the savings rates equation (definition 1)
are as follows: (1) per capita income is a strong positive determinant; (2) the sex of
the household head does not significantly affect savings rates; (3) savings rates
rise with age but does not decline, as expected from the life-cycle hypothesis; (4)
the availability of banking institutions positively affects the savings rates, (5)
access to national highways positively impacts the savings rates, although not
with respect to the availability of electricity; (6) savings rate is higher in urban
areas; and (7) the savings rates in almost all of the other regions, except in Western
Visayas (Region 6),  the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and
CARAGA, are higher than in the National Capital Region (NCR).
In the case of definition 2, the following are the deviations from the defini-
tion 1 results besides the insignificance of the number of children variable: (1) the
savings rate rises with age, but at a declining rate, lending some support to the life-
cycle hypothesis; (2) male-headed households have lower savings rates; and (3)
Region 6 has higher savings rate than the NCR.
Table 6 shows the estimation results using the interaction terms of the num-
ber of children and per capita income quintile dummy variables. These interaction
terms all turned out to be significant for both savings definitions. The impact on
the poorest quintile shows a decline by 2.8 percent while the corresponding re-
sults for the lower-middle to the richest quintile are, respectively, 0.9 (-2.8+3.6),
2.9 (-2.8+5.7), 4.8 (-2.8+7.6), and 6.2 (-2.8+9.0) for definition 1. The corresponding
results for definition 2 are 1.0 (-2.8+3.8), 3.2 (-2.8+6.0), 5.5 (-2.8+8.3), and 7.7







































4 Table 4. Determinants of household savings rate
[Definition 1:Total Income-Total Expenditures]
OLS (Robust SE) IV* OLS (Het.corrected)
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
No. of children -0.003819 0.001348 -2.83 0.00258 0.02614 0.10 -0.003617 0.001343 -2.69
Per capita income, 000 0.007936 0.000671 11.83 0.00808 0.00059 13.70 0.008135 0.000662 12.29
Male household head -0.009086 0.005401 -1.68 -0.01114 0.00992 -1.12 -0.008592 0.005392 -1.59
Age of household head 0.002329 0.001044 2.23 0.00119 0.00477 0.25 0.002245 0.001043 2.15
Age of household head, squared -0.000004 0.000010 -0.42 0.00001 0.00005 0.15 -0.000004 0.000010 -0.35
Pop per banking inst., 000 0.000925 0.000112 8.29 0.00092 0.00012 7.77 0.000924 0.000112 8.29
Prop. of bgy with acc. to nat’l highway 0.073444 0.020889 3.52 0.07598 0.02258 3.37 0.073719 0.020877 3.53
Prop. of bgy with electricity -0.029605 0.020026 -1.48 -0.03095 0.01940 -1.60 -0.030669 0.020006 -1.53
Urban dummy 0.057922 0.004435 13.06 0.05839 0.00429 13.60 0.057304 0.004420 12.96
Region 1 dummy 0.060230 0.009910 6.08 0.05986 0.00995 6.02 0.061158 0.009892 6.18
Region 2 dummy 0.095234 0.011329 8.41 0.09670 0.01239 7.81 0.095619 0.011321 8.45
Region 3 dummy 0.066376 0.007577 8.76 0.06641 0.00760 8.74 0.067139 0.007562 8.88
Region 4 dummy 0.034394 0.006820 5.04 0.03419 0.00700 4.88 0.034869 0.006811 5.12
Region 5 dummy 0.038612 0.010126 3.81 0.03681 0.01224 3.01 0.039737 0.010102 3.93
Region 6 dummy 0.004947 0.008859 0.56 0.00396 0.00956 0.41 0.006055 0.008833 0.69
Region 7 dummy 0.044775 0.009836 4.55 0.04397 0.00967 4.55 0.045777 0.009815 4.66
Region 8 dummy 0.066213 0.010760 6.15 0.06478 0.01180 5.49 0.067236 0.010739 6.26
Region 9 dummy 0.039084 0.011322 3.45 0.03859 0.01128 3.42 0.040062 0.011304 3.54
Region 10 dummy 0.062247 0.009856 6.32 0.06249 0.00946 6.61 0.063146 0.009839 6.42
Region 11 dummy 0.053261 0.009977 5.34 0.05292 0.00963 5.49 0.054401 0.009951 5.47
Region 12 dummy 0.084093 0.011201 7.51 0.08296 0.01171 7.08 0.084908 0.011185 7.59
CAR dummy 0.101432 0.011682 8.68 0.09991 0.01253 7.97 0.101858 0.011674 8.73









OLS (Robust SE) IV* OLS (Het.corrected)
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
Caraga dummy -0.007894 0.012013 -0.66 -0.00748 0.01067 -0.70 -0.006514 0.011983 -0.54
Constant -0.236148 0.029496 -8.01 -0.23314 0.03198 -7.29 -0.236422 0.029479 -8.02
R-Sq. 0.1500 0.1489 0.1500
Obs               24,140 24,140 24,140
Test of Heteroscedasticity
   Pagan-Hall Test Stat (P-value) 26.55(0.0000)
Endogeneity of No. of Children
    Wu-Hausman F test (P-value) 0.0601(0.8063)
    Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (P-value) 0.0602(0.8062)







































6 Table 5. Determinants of household savings rates
[Definition 2:Total Income-(Total Expenditures-Dur. Fur-Education-Health)]
OLS (Robust SE) IV* OLS (Het.corrected)
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
No. of children -0.00262 0.00138 -1.90 -0.01402 0.02529 -0.55 -0.00216 0.00137 -1.58
Per capita income, 000 0.00881 0.00076 11.56 0.00856 0.00057 15.01 0.00924 0.00075 12.35
Male household head -0.01578 0.00526 -3.00 -0.01213 0.00960 -1.26 -0.01456 0.00525 -2.78
Age of household head 0.00740 0.00103 7.19 0.00943 0.00461 2.04 0.00718 0.00103 7.01
Age of household head, squared -0.00005 0.00001 -5.10 -0.00007 0.00005 -1.51 -0.00005 0.00001 -4.92
Pop per banking inst., 000 0.00089 0.00011 8.14 0.00090 0.00011 7.89 0.00088 0.00011 8.13
Prop. of bgy with acc. to nat'l highway 0.07026 0.02017 3.48 0.06575 0.02185 3.01 0.07107 0.02015 3.53
Prop. of bgy with electricity -0.03391 0.01953 -1.74 -0.03151 0.01877 -1.68 -0.03662 0.01949 -1.88
Urban dummy 0.06299 0.00449 14.02 0.06216 0.00416 14.96 0.06171 0.00447 13.80
Region 1 dummy 0.06794 0.00955 7.11 0.06860 0.00962 7.13 0.06977 0.00953 7.32
Region 2 dummy 0.10741 0.01107 9.70 0.10480 0.01199 8.74 0.10851 0.01106 9.81
Region 3 dummy 0.07992 0.00738 10.82 0.07985 0.00735 10.86 0.08153 0.00736 11.08
Region 4 dummy 0.04823 0.00654 7.37 0.04859 0.00678 7.17 0.04927 0.00653 7.55
Region 5 dummy 0.04437 0.00998 4.45 0.04758 0.01185 4.02 0.04685 0.00994 4.71
Region 6 dummy 0.02325 0.00874 2.66 0.02501 0.00925 2.70 0.02542 0.00871 2.92
Region 7 dummy 0.04513 0.00972 4.65 0.04656 0.00936 4.98 0.04727 0.00969 4.88
Region 8 dummy 0.06522 0.01059 6.16 0.06777 0.01142 5.93 0.06755 0.01056 6.39
Region 9 dummy 0.03606 0.01114 3.24 0.03694 0.01091 3.38 0.03800 0.01112 3.42
Region 10 dummy 0.06257 0.00982 6.37 0.06214 0.00915 6.79 0.06453 0.00979 6.59
Region 11 dummy 0.06166 0.00983 6.27 0.06226 0.00932 6.68 0.06419 0.00979 6.55
Region 12 dummy 0.09766 0.01083 9.01 0.09968 0.01133 8.80 0.09922 0.01082 9.17
CAR dummy 0.12070 0.01112 10.85 0.12341 0.01213 10.18 0.12133 0.01111 10.92









OLS (Robust SE) IV* OLS (Het.corrected)
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
Caraga dummy 0.01086 0.01183 0.92 0.01013 0.01033 0.98 0.01371 0.01178 1.16
Constant -0.31085 0.02865 -10.85 -0.31620 0.03094 -10.22 -0.31080 0.02863 -10.85
R-Sq. 0.1893 0.1858 0.1890
Obs 24,120 24,120 24,120
Test of Heteroscedasticity
   Pagan-Hall Test Stat (P-value) 25.85(0.0000)
Endogeneity of No. of Children
    Wu-Hausman F test (P-value) 0.241(0.6514)
    Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (P-value) 0.2043(0.6513)
* For 2SLS instrumented with both male and both female.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 18
additional children on savings rate is negative on average and is regressive, i.e.,
negative on the poorest households and positive for the top four quintiles.
Savings levels
The endogeneity test for the savings levels equation also showed insignifi-
cance such as those for the savings rate equations. Again, similar to the savings
Table 6. Determinants of household savings rates
(OLS -Heteroscedasticity corrected)
Definition 1 Definition 2
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
No. of children -0.02757 0.00139 -19.80 -0.02789 0.00137 -20.29
No. of children x quintile 2 0.03628 0.00114 31.71 0.03755 0.00111 33.94
No. of children x quintile 3 0.05663 0.00133 42.65 0.05999 0.00126 47.68
No. of children x quintile 4 0.07580 0.00163 46.42 0.08337 0.00158 52.84
No. of children x quintile 5 0.08995 0.00350 25.73 0.10466 0.00357 29.33
Per capita income, 000 0.00493 0.00052 9.46 0.00515 0.00055 9.31
Male household head -0.00264 0.00495 -0.53 -0.00776 0.00461 -1.68
Age of household head -0.00346 0.00095 -3.64 0.00087 0.00091 0.96
Age of household head, squared 0.00004 0.00001 4.67 0.00000 0.00001 0.39
Pop per banking inst., 000 0.00074 0.00010 7.39 0.00069 0.00010 7.29
Prop. of bgy with acc. to nat’l highway 0.06726 0.01945 3.46 0.06381 0.01836 3.47
Prop. of bgy with electricity -0.12741 0.01828 -6.97 -0.14149 0.01732 -8.17
Urban dummy 0.00982 0.00370 2.66 0.00968 0.00351 2.76
Region 1 dummy 0.09101 0.00906 10.05 0.10422 0.00845 12.33
Region 2 dummy 0.11202 0.01016 11.02 0.12826 0.00966 13.28
Region 3 dummy 0.07775 0.00697 11.15 0.09506 0.00649 14.64
Region 4 dummy 0.04653 0.00641 7.26 0.06303 0.00596 10.58
Region 5 dummy 0.09616 0.00913 10.53 0.10922 0.00860 12.71
Region 6 dummy 0.04493 0.00781 5.75 0.06958 0.00730 9.53
Region 7 dummy 0.08935 0.00902 9.90 0.09604 0.00858 11.19
Region 8 dummy 0.11437 0.00983 11.63 0.11961 0.00932 12.83
Region 9 dummy 0.07209 0.01034 6.97 0.07435 0.00988 7.53
Region 10 dummy 0.12935 0.00892 14.51 0.13764 0.00853 16.14
Region 11 dummy 0.09855 0.00891 11.06 0.11441 0.00835 13.70
Region 12 dummy 0.11453 0.01051 10.90 0.13264 0.00992 13.37
CAR dummy 0.09812 0.01073 9.15 0.11708 0.00999 11.72
ARMM dummy 0.01623 0.01543 1.05 0.01854 0.01464 1.27
Caraga dummy 0.06403 0.01065 6.01 0.09191 0.01000 9.19
Constant -0.04857 0.02801 -1.73 -0.10207 0.02671 -3.82
R-Sq. 0.2643 0.3326
Obs 24,120 24,120ORBETA 19
rate equation, the heteroscedasticity tests also yielded significance. Under these
conditions, the heteroscedasticity-corrected OLS estimation is deemed most
reliable.
Tables 7 and 8 show the estimation results for the savings levels equations.
On average, the impact of additional children is negative for both definition 1 and
definition 2. Each additional child will cause a reduction of about -254 (deflated
1994=100) for definition 1 and -309 (deflated 1994=100) for definition 2. Relative to
the recorded average savings levels, this represents a reduction of about -3.3
percent for definition 1 and -2.7 percent for definition 2.
Here are other noteworthy results: (1) the marginal propensity to save is
about 0.52 for definition 1 and 0.59 for definition 28; (2) savings level is not affected
by the sex of the household head for both definitions; (3) savings level declines
with age at a declining rate; (4) savings level is not affected by the availability of
banking institutions for definition 1 but unexpectedly is negatively affected in
definition 2; (5) definition 1 savings is not affected by access to national highway
and negatively affected by the availability of electricity with definition 2; (6) sav-
ings level is lower in urban areas for both definitions9; and (7) with the exception
of the ARMM, savings level is higher in all other regions compared to the national
capital region10.
Table 9 presents the estimation results of using the interaction between the
number of children and per capita income dummy variables to capture the differen-
tial effects across socioeconomic classes. The results show that the impact of
children is insignificant for the poorest quintile for both definitions. For the top
four income quintiles, this is negative and increasing in magnitude as one goes up
the income classes.
Thus, the impact of additional children on savings levels is negative on
average. The impact across income classes is not significant for the poorest but
negative for the other income groups.
Summary of estimation results
To get a better picture of the impact of additional children on household savings
across the income classes, the computed impacts are expressed in percentage
terms relative to recorded rates and levels. The results show that the impact of
each additional child on savings rates is a -14 percent reduction for definition 1
and -18 percent reduction for definition 2 for the bottom quintile (Table 10). For the
top four quintiles, the resulting impacts on the savings rate in percentage terms are
8 Bautista and Lamberte (1990) estimated a savings propensity ranging from 0.334 to 0.775.
9 This agrees with the earlier results of Bautista and Lamberte (1990).







































0 Table 7. Determinants of household savings
[Definition 1:Total Income-Total Expenditures]
OLS (Robust SE) IV* OLS (Het.corrected)
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
No. of children -223.15 101.32 -2.20 1583.53 2184.29 0.72 -253.94 97.84 -2.60
Household income 0.56 0.04 13.09 0.56 0.00 202.20 0.52 0.03 14.94
Male household head 296.57 513.85 0.58 -375.15 940.18 -0.40 185.93 508.17 0.37
Age of household head -675.06 142.19 -4.75 -989.45 389.98 -2.54 -566.72 123.49 -4.59
Age of household head, squared 5.38 1.31 4.12 8.72 4.12 2.11 4.60 1.19 3.85
Pop per banking inst., 000 -1.74 5.01 -0.35 -3.93 10.45 -0.38 -0.15 4.91 -0.03
Prop. of bgy with acc. to nat'l highway -2213.78 1729.82 -1.28 -1406.90 2044.80 -0.69 -2400.44 1718.63 -1.40
Prop. of bgy with electricity -14086.64 2092.07 -6.73 -14300.84 1686.26 -8.48 -12686.38 1845.19 -6.88
Urban dummy -5309.24 865.69 -6.13 -5041.13 473.20 -10.65 -4590.52 745.58 -6.16
Region 1 dummy 13476.15 1285.96 10.48 13226.26 930.55 14.21 12801.99 1212.95 10.55
Region 2 dummy 13845.52 1294.52 10.70 14189.26 1056.44 13.43 13442.42 1271.94 10.57
Region 3 dummy 11633.72 1377.71 8.44 11511.39 696.25 16.53 10790.27 1258.90 8.57
Region 4 dummy 8380.79 1023.44 8.19 8233.29 647.75 12.71 7970.41 992.88 8.03
Region 5 dummy 14794.09 1414.79 10.46 14089.60 1221.47 11.53 13738.12 1260.89 10.90
Region 6 dummy 9610.37 1283.77 7.49 9204.46 918.75 10.02 8853.93 1205.21 7.35
Region 7 dummy 13918.73 1428.58 9.74 13487.50 966.91 13.95 12917.54 1290.31 10.01
Region 8 dummy 14126.09 1281.16 11.03 13561.31 1143.71 11.86 13309.93 1185.34 11.23
Region 9 dummy 11717.86 1235.55 9.48 11435.60 1050.89 10.88 10978.42 1154.23 9.51
Region 10 dummy 17113.80 1476.21 11.59 16977.20 858.37 19.78 16048.13 1323.03 12.13
Region 11 dummy 14997.72 1549.37 9.68 14746.21 906.14 16.27 13910.48 1408.06 9.88
Region 12 dummy 11833.06 1181.24 10.02 11385.03 1104.98 10.30 11242.14 1126.63 9.98
CAR dummy 10405.47 1078.81 9.65 9962.08 1112.08 8.96 10416.18 1075.14 9.69









OLS (Robust SE) IV* OLS (Het.corrected)
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
Caraga dummy 15362.83 1638.50 9.38 15264.48 951.17 16.05 14177.03 1459.49 9.71
Constant 7211.49 3254.32 2.22 8000.05 2813.79 2.84 5186.02 2951.77 1.76
R-Sq. 0.678 0.674 0.674
Obs 24,120 24,120 24,120
Test of Heteroscedasticity
   Pagan-Hall Test Stat (P-value) 4,667.7(0.000)
Endogeneity of No. of Children
    Wu-Hausman F test (P-value) 0.694(0.405)
    Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (P-value) 0.695(0.405)







































2 Table 8. Determinants of household savings
[Definition 2:Total Income-(Total Expenditures-Dur. Fur-Education-Health)]
OLS (Robust SE) IV* OLS (Het.corrected)
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
No. of children -281.96 89.47 -3.15 2055.21 1923.49 1.07 -309.10 86.95 -3.55
Household income 0.63 0.04 17.24 0.63 0.00 259.02 0.59 0.03 19.91
Male household head -548.32 411.78 -1.33 -1417.28 827.92 -1.71 -750.45 398.10 -1.89
Age of household head -415.75 132.60 -3.14 -822.45 343.42 -2.39 -304.31 114.41 -2.66
Age of household head, squared 2.83 1.24 2.28 7.14 3.63 1.97 2.01 1.12 1.79
Pop per banking inst.,000 -1.53 4.30 -0.36 -4.37 9.20 -0.47 -4041.83 637.73 -6.34
Prop. of bgy with acc. to nat'l highway -1987.45 1536.51 -1.29 -943.64 1800.65 -0.52 -0.09 4.24 -0.02
Prop. of bgy with electricity -13617.61 1828.13 -7.45 -13894.70 1484.92 -9.36 -2018.45 1519.33 -1.33
Urban dummy -4758.91 747.13 -6.37 -4412.07 416.70 -10.59 -12175.09 1595.27 -7.63
Region 1 dummy 13288.13 1119.08 11.87 12964.87 819.44 15.82 12800.19 1078.89 11.86
Region 2 dummy 14318.58 1126.56 12.71 14763.25 930.30 15.87 14146.26 1121.06 12.62
Region 3 dummy 12009.50 1160.42 10.35 11851.25 613.11 19.33 11414.66 1093.17 10.44
Region 4 dummy 9202.31 878.00 10.48 9011.50 570.41 15.80 9029.37 869.14 10.39
Region 5 dummy 15016.00 1180.14 12.72 14104.66 1075.62 13.11 14229.29 1088.72 13.07
Region 6 dummy 11172.71 1030.90 10.84 10647.61 809.05 13.16 10791.80 1004.81 10.74
Region 7 dummy 13851.00 1212.46 11.42 13293.15 851.46 15.61 13076.01 1129.36 11.58
Region 8 dummy 14234.87 1077.05 13.22 13504.25 1007.15 13.41 13680.00 1030.47 13.28
Region 9 dummy 11937.53 1050.54 11.36 11572.40 925.41 12.51 11484.52 1016.53 11.30
Region 10 dummy 16993.83 1239.14 13.71 16817.13 755.88 22.25 16154.29 1142.45 14.14
Region 11 dummy 15409.32 1302.07 11.83 15083.96 797.94 18.90 14587.10 1225.84 11.90
Region 12 dummy 12437.71 1015.27 12.25 11858.13 973.04 12.19 12126.09 994.86 12.19
CAR dummy 11052.50 982.76 11.25 10478.92 979.29 10.70 11264.57 974.71 11.56









OLS (Robust SE) IV* OLS (Het.corrected)
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. t Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
Caraga dummy 16242.83 1357.43 11.97 16115.60 837.60 19.24 15311.25 1241.89 12.33
Constant 913.92 3044.36 0.30 1934.02 2477.82 0.78 -1577.86 2689.58 -0.59
R-Sq. 0.780 0.773 0.777
Obs 24,120 24,120 24,120
Test of Heteroscedasticity
   Pagan-Hall Test Stat (P-value) 4,337.4(0.000)
Endogeneity of No. of Children
    Wu-Hausman F test (P-value) 1.52(0.217)
    Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (P-value) 1.53(0.217)
* For 2SLS instrumented with both male and both female.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 24
Table 9. Determinants of household savings
(OLS -Heteroscedasticity corrected)
Definition 1 Definition 2
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
No. of children 84.33 103.59 0.81 49.41 91.40 0.54
No. of children x quintile 2 -593.68 85.01 -6.98 -592.41 75.70 -7.83
No. of children x quintile 3 -1538.13 224.90 -6.84 -1445.43 198.89 -7.27
No. of children x quintile 4 -3457.89 511.23 -6.76 -3044.24 450.02 -6.76
No. of children x quintile 5 -9113.79 1547.97 -5.89 -7279.21 1355.18 -5.37
Per capita income, 000 0.64 0.05 13.17 0.69 0.04 16.32
Male household head -1310.75 490.67 -2.67 -1856.98 375.63 -4.94
Age of household head -258.00 100.92 -2.56 -63.71 94.64 -0.67
Age of household head, squared 1.56 1.09 1.43 -0.34 1.02 -0.34
Pop per banking inst., 000 -0.54 5.05 -0.11 0.39 4.32 0.09
Prop. of bgy with acc. to nat'l highway-2057.04 1647.19 -1.25 -1729.57 1466.33 -1.18
Prop. of bgy with electricity -9587.56 1470.84 -6.52 -9563.68 1293.24 -7.40
Urban dummy -2752.75 377.37 -7.29 -2514.57 327.39 -7.68
Region 1 dummy 10288.91 1022.81 10.06 10738.90 953.65 11.26
Region 2 dummy 11492.87 1150.66 9.99 12509.21 1033.51 12.10
Region 3 dummy 9344.64 998.35 9.36 10255.51 895.01 11.46
Region 4 dummy 6863.20 892.25 7.69 8071.27 795.45 10.15
Region 5 dummy 11091.13 924.05 12.00 11942.62 820.30 14.56
Region 6 dummy 6203.06 1071.52 5.79 8481.52 892.52 9.50
Region 7 dummy 10625.66 953.30 11.15 11131.28 866.32 12.85
Region 8 dummy 10939.98 972.24 11.25 11607.26 871.68 13.32
Region 9 dummy 8893.22 962.67 9.24 9688.22 868.29 11.16
Region 10 dummy 12993.86 921.93 14.09 13525.39 830.36 16.29
Region 11 dummy 10915.69 1095.03 9.97 12079.43 992.30 12.17
Region 12 dummy 9342.94 985.66 9.48 10485.18 889.82 11.78
CAR dummy 10503.34 1080.41 9.72 11229.43 979.12 11.47
ARMM dummy 9486.84 1211.02 7.83 10032.03 1064.84 9.42
Caraga dummy 10624.58 1043.47 10.18 12282.00 911.96 13.47
Constant -1813.88 2640.69 -0.69 -7171.11 2375.81 -3.02
R-Sq. 0.7089 0.7981
Obs 24,120 24,120
positive and declining as one goes up the income classes. For the savings level,
the impact is insignificant for the poorest income class and negative for the upper
income classes. Similar to the pattern of the effect on the savings rates, the impact
in percentage terms also declines as one goes up the income classes.
These results show the negative and regressive effect that additional chil-
dren have on both the savings rates and levels of households.ORBETA 25
SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper formulates and estimates savings functions, recognizing the endogeneity
of the number of children, as required by the old-age security hypothesis. In
addition, it controls for income and other household and community variables
common to savings functions. It uses a nationally representative household sur-
vey data.
The estimation results show the negative impact of children on house-
hold savings. In addition and perhaps more importantly, it finds that the im-
pact of additional children on the saving rates and levels of households is
regressive. In particular, the results can be summarized in two statements. One,
the impact on the savings rates of the bottom quintile is negative. Two, the
impact on the savings level is negative, except for the poorest quintile, who are
dissaving, and, in percentage terms, is greater among the lower-income house-
holds.
The implications of these results are clear. At the household level, additional
children, particularly among poorer households, will expose some more families to
the risk of income shortfalls. They also deprive households of the prospect of
exploiting available investment opportunities. At the aggregate level, additional
children contribute to the reduction in saving rates, further depressing the already
low savings rate of the country. These results also imply that reducing the number
of children can help beef up savings to protect families from income shortfalls. It
constitutes an important alternative to a formal safety net, given the limited reach
of the social security system.
Table 10. Impact of children on savings rate and levels
        Rate                    Levels
Def 1 Def 2 Def 1 Def 2
coeff. % coeff. % coeff. % coeff. %
Average -0.36 -12.96 ns ns -254 -3.28 -309 -2.74
Poorest -2.76 -13.90 -2.79 -18.22 ns ns ns ns
Lower middle 0.87 41.12 0.97 32.42 -594 -433.35 -592 -61.13
Middle 2.91 48.97 3.21 27.50 -1,538 -63.16 -1,445 -32.63
Upper middle 4.82 36.96 5.55 27.24 -3,458 -43.52 -3,044 -25.28
Richest 6.27 27.07 7.68 23.53 -9,114 -23.86 -7,279 -14.46
Means 0.028 0.091 7,742 10,854
ns - not significant
Source: Computed from Tables 4-9.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 26
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